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Summary 
Implementing and complying with standards and certifi cation oft en increases costs 
for supply chain actors. Th ese increased costs are caused by upgrading production, logistics 
and marketing needed to achieve compliance, and can lead to the exclusion of actors from 
the supply chain. In particular, the exclusion of small-scale growers in developing countries 
as the result of the expansion and proliferation of private voluntary standards (PVS) used by 
large procurers has been extensively reported. Costs of PVS are per certifi cation and the unit 
is usually the individual farm, regardless of its size. In much of the developing world small-
holder production dominates domestic food production, and these small farms face propor-
tionately higher costs per unit area for certifi cation and compliance. Benefi ts of PVS are per 
production unit, giving benefi ts to larger farms. Developing world smallholder production 
tends to be on less than one hectare, giving relatively small production. Compared with the 
costs per farm, there is an inherent bias in many standards and certifi cation towards larger 
farms. Standards in export horticulture can, potentially, incentivize a more active role for 
the private sector in investing in small-scale growers in ways that are mutually benefi cial for 
growers and exporters. Such co-investment is a feature of trading relationships and business 
models that are inclusive of small-scale growers. In Kenyan horticulture, donors, exporters 
and smallholders have in some cases managed to leverage PVS requirements into profi table 
local agricultural developments. In this paper, we use resource-based strategic alliance the-
ory to explain the patterns that have evolved. We propose greater use of cooperation theory 
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to help make more effi  cient economic development interventions which are complementary 
with private-sector investments. We explore how standards might be used to accelerate de-
velopment initiatives.
Key words: strategic alliances, small scale agriculture, Kenya, private voluntary 
standards, GlobalGAP.
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e implementation of, and compliance with, standards and certifi cation is typ-
ically associated with increased costs for supply chain actors. Th ese increased costs are 
incurred through the necessary upgrading of production, logistics and marketing to 
achieve compliance. Exclusion of certain actors from the supply chain can be one con-
sequence of these increased costs. In particular, the exclusion of small-scale growers in 
developing countries as a result of the expansion and proliferation of private voluntary 
standards (PVS) used by large procurers has been extensively reported.
Costs of PVS are per certifi cation and the unit is usually the individual farm, 
regardless of size. In much of the developing world smallholder production dominates, 
and these small farms face proportionately higher costs per unit area for certifi cation 
and compliance. Due to these problems, there is oft en an inherent bias in many stan-
dards and certifi cation procedures towards larger farms. In those cases where develop-
ment benefi ts can be demonstrated, there is potential to leverage donor funding, tech-
nical assistance and other support, which can reduce total cost burdens of compliance 
with standards and certifi cation, but which pose important questions in terms of their 
long-term sustainability.
Benefi ts of PVS are per production unit, giving benefi ts to larger farms. Develop-
ing world smallholder production tends to be on less than one hectare, giving relatively 
small production. Compared with the costs per farm, there is an inherent bias in many 
standards and certifi cation towards larger farms.
Indeed, considering all the concern about the exclusionary nature of PVS, per-
haps the most surprising feature of horticultural exports from East Africa is the per-
sistence of the market inclusion of smallholders. Th e Fresh Produce Exporters Associa-
tion of Kenya estimates that there are 6000 small-scale growers involved in the produc-
tion of fresh vegetables for export markets in Kenya alone. In addition to these 6000, 
many more are involved in the production of non-fresh, standards-compliant export 
markets. For example, up to 10,000 small-scale growers are thought to be involved in the 
production of French beans for canned and frozen exports.
Standards in export horticulture can, potentially, incentivize a more active role 
for the private sector in investing in small-scale growers in ways that are mutually bene-
fi cial for growers and exporters. Such co-investment is a feature of trading relationships 
and business models that are inclusive of small-scale growers.
In Kenyan horticulture, donors, exporters and smallholders have in some cases 
managed to leverage PVS requirements into profi table local agricultural developments; 
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in other cases, PVS requirements have led to the exclusion of smallholders, and a col-
lapse of previously existing sourcing arrangements. Using survey data on smallholder 
farming and large-scale exporters, we use strategic alliance theory to explain the pat-
terns that have evolved.
2. BACKGROUND
Th e production and processing of fresh produce for export to European markets 
is an attractive opportunity for the agricultural sector in sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, 
the value of fruit and vegetable exports has more than quadrupled in real terms over the 
past thirty years; horticulture has become the country’s largest single source of export 
earnings, and some 4.5 million people are estimated to be employed in production or 
processing of horticultural products (Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya, 
2013). Until 2003, export companies primarily relied largely on casual purchases of veg-
etables, either directly from small-scale farmers or through informal supply chains of 
brokers and middlemen. However, since then the compliance framework for exports 
to the EU has been getting tighter, owing to food safety issues. Th e concern is that the 
tightening of regulations – both public and private – results in the exclusion of SSGs, 
with wider poverty implications for rural Africa.
Global Good Agricultural Practice, GlobalGAP (formerly known as EurepGAP) 
is a private sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certifi cation of agricul-
tural products around the globe (for up-to-date information about their certifi cation 
requirements, see e.g. GlobalGAP 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, and other documents 
available at www.globalgap.org). Th e GlobalGAP standard is primarily designed to re-
assure consumers about how food is produced on the farm by minimising detrimental 
environmental impacts of farming operations, reducing the use of chemical inputs and 
ensuring a responsible approach to worker health and safety as well as animal welfare. 
GlobalGAP has become the most widely respected and accepted family of standards 
for primary production of agricultural products. Today there are more than 130,000 
GlobalGAP certifi ed producers in over 120 countries. GlobalGAP certifi cation has be-
come virtually a mandatory market access requirement for producers wishing to sell 
to GlobalGAP’s 48 food retailer members, which include most of the major players in 
the EU, the US, and Japan as well as retailers in China, Russia, South Africa, and oth-
er countries. GlobalGAP has standards for a wide range of products, including fruits, 
vegetables, combinable crops & herbs. Other GlobalGAP standards include coff ee, tea, 
fl owers and ornamentals, cattle, sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry, farmed fi sh (salmon and 
trout), plant propagation material, livestock transport and livestock feed manufacture.
Multiple benefi ts for retailers and other supply chain players can be provided by 
PVS such as GlobalGAP, including the demonstration of due diligence in compliance 
with public standards such as the EU food laws (showing the close interrelationship 
between public and private regulation), the creation of smoother business-to-business 
transactions and ammunition in the battle between branded goods and retailers’ own 
brands. However, research has long shown that the adoption and implementation of pri-
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vate voluntary standards is costly (e.g. Borot de Battisti et al., 2009). Th ese costs occur at 
both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, these costs are in the form of public 
investments in standards agencies, upgraded skills required for management in agron-
omy and infrastructure development, and the monitoring of trades. At the micro level, 
costs are incurred through producers and supply chain actors ensuring and demon-
strating compliance in the form of investments in logistics, production and marketing. 
Costs of PVS are per certifi cation and the unit is usually the individual farm, regardless 
of size. In much of the developing world smallholder production dominates, and these 
small farms face proportionately higher costs per unit area for certifi cation and com-
pliance. Due to these problems, there is oft en an inherent bias in many standards and 
certifi cation towards larger farms. Th ere is genuine concern that the proliferation of pri-
vate standards adds further to the overall costs of, and hence barriers to, trade without 
adding compensatory value for supply chain participants.
Several researchers have found a falling number of small-scale farmers involved 
in export horticulture. Th is decrease has been attributed primarily to the rising costs 
of production associated with the need to adhere to increasingly stringent standards 
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Gibbon, 2003; Humphrey et al., 2004). Exporters typical-
ly take production in-house to reduce transaction costs and risk, and move away from 
the more traditional spot-markets that were arguably easier for small-scale growers to 
access.
Th e GlobalGAP protocol has several options available for certifi cation. Option 1 
is a single farm certifi cation where the farmer takes responsibility for ensuring compli-
ance, whereas option 2 allows for certifi cation of groups of farms under one certifi cate 
on condition that the group can demonstrate a centralised management system operat-
ing via a primary marketing organisation (PMO) with a GlobalGAP compliant ISO type 
quality management system in place. Each grower must be registered under the PMO 
and have signed a legally binding contract to comply with all the control measures for 
GlobalGAP specifi ed by the PMO. Under option 2, the PMO takes full legal responsibil-
ity for GlobalGAP compliance by all members of the group. Option 2 was designed for 
group certifi cations (especially among the large cooperative farms of Southern Europe 
that sometimes have ~2,000 farms sites in one cooperative) and off ers advantages in 
terms of cost savings by allowing for external auditing of a small number (typically the 
square root of the total number of sites is audited by the certifying body) of farm sites 
rather than all sites. Th is option also provides more opportunities for smallholder farm-
ers in sub-Saharan Africa to become certifi ed as part of the supply chain, provided that 
they become part of a certifi ed group.
In view of the low level of homogeneity between farm sites, group certifi cations 
must meet the strict requirements of the GlobalGAP quality management system that 
only applies to option 2. Under option 2 each farm must pay a GlobalGAP registration 
fee, a fee must be paid for auditing the quality management system (QMS), and a similar 
fee is payable for each farm site chosen for audit by the certifying body. Th e time taken 
for an option 2 certifi cation varies according to the number of farm sites to be audit-
ed but typically requires 2-5 days to complete with obvious cost implications in terms 
of auditors fees. Another cost for option 2 certifi cation is the need for several random 
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Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) tests per year, costing £85 – £150 per sample (Graff -
ham, 2007).
In contrast, single farm certifi cation audits under option 1 of GlobalGAP require 
between half and one day and have no QMS component, one registration and certifi ca-
tion fee and one annual MRL test for the farm (Graffh  am, 2007). Many have considered 
getting groups of SSGs certifi ed under option 1 of GlobalGAP as this would be much 
simpler and cheaper, but the general regulations of GlobalGAP have always prohibited 
this for the very good reason that a large group of farm sites with individual owners 
cannot be considered as having the same level of homogeneity as a single farm with only 
one management team.
Th is means that GlobalGAP and other PVS provide strong incentives for consol-
idation of agricultural production; such eff ects have been observed in other countries 
(see e.g. Maertens and Swinnen, 2009, who fi nd clear evidence of this eff ect in Senegal) 
and similar eff ects might have been expected for the horticultural sector in Kenya. From 
an exporting company’s viewpoint, there are two possible routes; either to bring pro-
duction in-house by acquiring agricultural land for own production, certifi ed under 
GlobalGAP’s Option 1, or to form a permanent or semi-permanent arrangement with 
smallholder farmers who have a group certifi cation under Option 2. From the viewpoint 
of the smallholder farmer, group certifi cation, either through an exporter or through a 
farmer cooperative, is the only realistic means of remaining in horticultural production 
as an autonomous or semi-autonomous producer; the other options are to opt out of 
export production and sell primarily to the domestic market, or to sell the land to a 
(certifi ed) producer and potentially become a farm worker on a larger farm which is 
certifi ed under Option 1.
Given the obvious transactions costs associated with dealing with a large num-
ber of semi-autonomous producers, it might seem likely that an exporter will opt for 
Option 1; acquiring land and establishing own, certifi ed, production instead. Howev-
er, as we shall see, in almost all cases that we studied the patterns that have actually 
emerged are diff erent.
3. THEORY
Strategic alliances are ongoing, formalised business relationships between two or 
more independent organisations that wish to use the alliance setup in order to achieve 
common goals (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1992) and therefore establish inter-fi rm coopera-
tive arrangements in order to jointly accomplish their individual goals (Parkhe, 1993). 
Any voluntary cooperative agreement between fi rms that involves exchange, sharing, or 
co-development can be seen as a strategic alliance, and can include partner contribu-
tions of capital, technology, or fi rm-specifi c assets (Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Lin and Lin, 2010).
Strategic alliances are hybrid governance structures, where interactions are more 
formalised than arm’s length transactions but less formalised than outright acquisi-
tions. Firms may form strategic alliances for a variety of reasons (Elmuti and Kathawa-
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la, 2001). Being part of an alliance allows the fi rm access to complementary resources, 
making it possible to focus on a small part of the total value system (Porter, 1985) and 
still be able to off er a larger total value to customers (Gulati, 2007). Alliance formation 
therefore meets strategic needs and social opportunities, and alliances are more easily 
formed when there are fi rms within the alliance led by large experienced and well-con-
nected top-management teams (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). According to 
Bleeke and Ernst (1995), the likelihood of success is better when alliances are formed 
between companies that complement each other, while alliances between competitive 
companies are more likely to fail since strong competition between two cooperating 
companies increases the risk for opportunistic behaviour.
Das and Teng (2000), in their seminal paper on resource-based strategic allianc-
es, note that the resources available to diff erent fi rms are frequently crucial for the types 
of relationships that these fi rms form. Firms are characterised by having access to dif-
ferent sets of productive resources which are useful in diff erent types of production and 
which may or may not be easily transferable to other fi rms. Th ey identify the decision 
to form a strategic alliance as what can be seen as an intermediary case between out-
right acquisition and arms-length market-based relationship, where the goal in all three 
cases is to make use of those of the other fi rm’s productive resources that are useful for 
the own fi rm’s production. If the services from the relevant resources in the other fi rm 
can be purchased effi  ciently through the market, fi rms will tend to prefer arm’s length 
transactions where each fi rm maintains control over, and management responsibility 
for, its own assets. If the resources themselves can be purchased effi  ciently through the 
market, or if fi rms owning these resources can be purchased easily and the less attrac-
tive resources of the purchased fi rm can then be resold easily, fi rms will tend to prefer 
outright acquisition. Alliances become attractive when arm’s length interactions with 
the other fi rm are ineffi  cient, but the bundle of resources owned by the other fi rm also 
contain resources that are irrelevant for the own fi rm’s production process and that 
cannot easily be disposed of.
In terms of the resources owned by a fi rm, Das and Teng (2000) distinguish be-
tween property-based resources linked to ownership (including intellectual property, 
if protected by law), and knowledge-based resources linked to know-how and skills. 
While an agent collaborating with other agents in an alliance can usually maintain 
control over its property-based resources, it will in practice oft en lose control over its 
knowledge-based resources once these become available to its allies in the network and 
these can begin to use that knowledge within their own organisations. Th is means that 
an agent which is primarily bringing property-based resources into an alliance will not 
be overly worried about losing control over these assets, and will be open to a wide range 
of organisational setups for the alliance. On the other hand, if an agent primarily brings 
knowledge-based resources into an alliance, it risks losing control over these assets – 
and thus becoming less important as an ally – once other agents in the alliance have 
gained access to its knowledge assets, and will therefore tend to prefer either outright 
acquisition of other agents in the alliance or, alternatively, an arm’s-length working rela-
tionship with its partners such that they do not gain access to its resources. When both 
agents bring property-based resources into an alliance, the normal outcome is to have 
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unilateral contracts specifying the commitments of the respective parties; when one of 
the parties brings knowledge-based resources into the alliance, equity-sharing arrange-
ments tend to be more common; when both parties primarily bring knowledge-based 
arrangements into the alliance, bilateral contracts specifying joint knowledge develop-
ment tend to dominate.
Moreover, the property-based and knowledge-based groups of resources both 
contain assets that may be either imperfectly mobile, and cannot be shift ed easily to 
other organisations; or imperfectly substitutable, and cannot easily be replaced as part 
of the production process. Das and Teng (2000) identify human resources as imperfectly 
mobile and physical resources as examples of imperfectly substitutable property-based 
resources; we would add to this that in many developing countries, including Kenya, 
agricultural land is frequently not only imperfectly substitutable but may also be imper-
fectly mobile, because unclear tenure rules make land transactions onerous and costly. 
Th e skills needed to market produce in export markets have also become increasingly 
immobile; they were diffi  cult to acquire for an individual smallholder even before the 
advent of PVS and GlobalGAP, but are now completely out of reach.
Prior to the establishment of GlobalGAP and its predecessor EurepGAP, the typ-
ical arrangement was an arm’s-length supply chain where diff erent agents along the 
supply chain primarily interacted through market transactions. Exporters purchased 
horticultural produce from smallholder farmers on a spot market basis, either directly 
through own procurement agents or indirectly through middlemen (for more details on 
Kenyan procurement arrangements, see e.g. Dolan, 2001, or Rao and Qaim, 2013). From 
a resource-based strategic alliance perspective, this pattern indicates that the main “ser-
vice” provided by the smallholder farms, from the perspective of the exporters, was hor-
ticultural produce which could easily be purchased in the market. By maintaining the 
supply chain as a primarily market-based one, exporters could avoid taking on respon-
sibility for the agricultural process itself. Exporters typically also maintained their own 
land holdings and their own agricultural production, but nonetheless clearly preferred 
also buying produce from farmers rather than producing everything themselves; a like-
ly explanation is the fact that smallholders had better knowledge of the local markets 
and thus could more easily dispose of surplus production there, so that exporters could 
draw on smallholder production when needed but avoided responsibility for developing 
the skills needed to maintain domestic sales as well. On the other hand, from the per-
spective of the smallholder farmers, exporters provided an attractive sales outlet, which 
provided the “service” of maintaining contacts with foreign purchasers. Th ere was thus 
a clear division of labour, where diff erent parts of the supply chain maintained control 
over diff erent sets of resources and provided useful services for each other, while main-
taining a high degree of autonomy.
With the advent of more stringent standards in the foreign export markets, the 
old supply chain relationship began breaking down (Dolan, 2003; Humphrey et al., 
2004). Th e new certifi cation procedures were too costly for individual smallholder farms 
to undertake on their own. Th ree potential scenarios would have been, (a) for farmers 
to form exporting co-operatives to co-manage certifi cation procedures and exporting 
links (see, e.g., Fulton et al., 1996 for this type of marketing alliance in the US) which 
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would typically have required fi nancial assets for the initial certifi cation investments, 
but would also have required the development of a new set of managerial skills in or-
der to develop new, own-managed export businesses; (b) for exporters to acquire more 
land in order to set up own, certifi ed agricultural production of all the crops needed 
for export (see, e.g., Maertens and Swinnen, 2009 for this type of outcome in Senegal), 
which would have required developing the skills needed to sell surplus and discarded 
production in domestic markets, and would also have meant undertaking the onerous 
process of acquiring land; or (c) some form of more formalised alliance between the two 
groups of agents than had been the case in the past. From a resource-based perspective, 
we can see that option (c) would enable both groups of agents to avoid some of the costs 
involved in acquiring the productive resources needed to take over the other group’s 
role in the supply chain, and we would therefore expect to see this option become the 
dominant one. Since both groups primarily provide property-based resources (land, 
farm labour and access to domestic markets on the one hand, fi nancial resources and 
access to export markets on the other) we would expect from Das and Teng (2000) that 
the primary form of alliance should be one of unilateral contracts between exporter and 
farmer.
4. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A survey of eleven exporters and exporting organisations was carried out in Ken-
ya (for details on the survey work, see Graffh  am et al., 2007) in tandem with agricultural 
survey work in Zambia (reported in Graffh  am and MacGregor, 2007) and in Uganda 
(reported in Kleih et al., 2007). Th e surveyed exporters controlled over 50% of the Ken-
yan export horticulture market and over 80% of Kenyan horticultural exports to the 
EU. Th e survey found that there was indeed a drop in the formal participation of small 
scale growers in these companies’ supplier networks. Th e survey recorded a reduction of 
over 40% in their reported use of small-scale farmer suppliers to certifi ed markets, from 
9342 to 5475. No formal questionnaire was followed; rather a semi-structured interview 
process was used to elicit answers, views and refl ections on fi nancial costs and benefi ts, 
production changes, satisfaction with the compliance process and non-fi nancial chang-
es and benefi ts.
Th e survey tool collected a range of data and qualitative information to enable 
analysis of these data to ascertain the incentives involved with export horticulture. In-
terviews were conducted with company personnel and farmers involved in GlobalGAP 
compliant smallholder schemes. Th e data obtained gives a good perspective on the costs 
of compliance from the point of view of farmers and exporters, and qualitative infor-
mation on the benefi ts of compliance and challenges faced by the various stakeholders. 
Th e fi gures for donor inputs only include those known to the exporting companies, and 
could in reality be much higher as the exporters do not have fi gures for international 
consultant costs and costs of running donor projects in the country.
Data on the fi nancial costs and benefi ts of producing export crops in Kenya were 
used to illustrate incentives for smallholder farmers to continue being part of Global-
GAP. From the analysis the viability of GlobalGAP compliance for small-scale growers 
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Figure 1: Average initial costs for small-scale growers
Note: GlobalGAP compliance, based on ten exporters and farmers engaged with them in trading 
relationships, Kenya, 2006 (from Graffh  am et al., 2007). Figures in inset boxes indicate the number 
of farmers sourced by each exporter. “Exporter 2” in the fi gure is the vegetable marketing organ-
isation mentioned in the text (comprising two exporting fi rms) while Exporter 6 is the exporter 
opting for GlobalGAP’s Option 1.
could be examined, using data on turnover from crop sales (measured as price actually 
paid for harvested quantity minus discards), initial investment costs associated with 
setting up GlobalGAP compliant systems, recurring costs associated with compliance 
activities, production costs, credit costs associated with compliance, and increases in 
labour costs.
5. RESULTS
In eight of the eleven cases surveyed, the exporting fi rm had set up a con-
tract-based alliance directly with selected smallholder farmers who were given support 
both for the investment costs needed to become certifi ed under GlobalGAP’s option 
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2 and for the subsequent costs needed to maintain certifi cation. Two of the surveyed 
exporters had set up an alliance through a vegetable marketing organisation, which had 
been established by the exporters but which subsequently became an independent entity 
and which helped the farmers handle certifi cation costs. In the last of the eleven cases 
surveyed, the exporting company had opted for GlobalGAP’s option 1 and expanded 
“own production”; the quotation marks refer to the fact that this was a trial exercise 
where smallholder farmers retained ownership of their land but were, technically, hired 
by the exporting company as farm managers of their respective farms and required to 
implement the GlobalGAP certifi cation standards. Th us, eight of the surveyed export-
ers had clearly opted for strategic alliances with selected farmer groups; the remaining 
three had, in theory, not done this, but had nonetheless established similar relationships 
that were less formalised than outright acquisitions but more formalised than the pre-
vious arm’s length relationships.
In several of the cases surveyed, donors had provided support to the investment 
phase associated with setting up the GlobalGAP compliant system. Th e average invest-
ment costs per farmer, and the shares paid by farmer, exporter and donor, respectively, 
are shown in Figure 1.
It may be noted that donor support varied considerably between diff erent ex-
porters; smaller farmer groups typically received higher investment support, both as 
shares of the total and in absolute terms, than the larger groups did. It is not obvious 
that the donor support made the local distribution of costs more “pro-poor”, as several 
of the schemes with least donor support also saw the greatest share of local costs borne 
by exporters rather than by farmers.
Donor support can normally only be given to investment costs and not to recur-
rent costs, so crucial issues are whether the initial support (if any) is enough to make the 
compliant system fi nancially sustainable and how the recurrent costs of maintaining 
the system are shared between the exporter and the farmers.
Th e costs of maintaining GlobalGAP compliance were typically borne almost 
exclusively by the exporting fi rm rather than by the farmers (Figure 2); in all but one of 
the cases for which data on maintenance costs were available, the exporter paid for three 
quarters or more of the overall maintenance cost. In the (fewer) cases where enough 
data were available to assess the net margins remaining to farmers before paying for 
maintenance costs, we fi nd that in most cases farmers could have paid substantially 
more of the maintenance costs. However, this would have made them highly sensitive to 
variations in the price of horticultural produce, and would have made the arrangements 
substantially less attractive for them.
Th e cost and revenue structure for sampled farmers in Buteko, a fairly typical 
smallholder farming area in Zambia, can serve as an example of why exporters in a 
sub-Saharan country might choose to fund such a large share of the farmers’ costs (Ta-
ble 1). Net income among the surveyed farmers is some 669 GBP per year, which is a 
good income for a smallholder farmer but would only be suffi  cient to pay an external 
farm manager if that manager were recruited from some other smallholder farm. Ed-
ucated external farm managers tend to expect substantially higher pay, so an exporter 
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would either have to maintain roughly the same type of labour input as the current 
smallholder farms have, or acquire large tracts of land in order to utilise economies 
of scale. An average farm is subdivided over an average of 5.6 diff erent plots, cover-
ing a total land area of only 6.2 hectares; thus, acquiring enough land to set up large 
scale farming would entail purchasing (or renting) numerous diff erent farms in order to 
merge the diff erent plots, which would not be a simple undertaking in a country where 
land markets function poorly. Finally, we may note that the average exportable yield is 
approximately one eighth of the total yield, with the rest being discarded for exports 
for one reason or another such that it can only be sold in domestic markets. An export-
er wishing to set up own farming on this land would need to develop new marketing 
channels in order to sell produce domestically, whereas the established farmers already 
have such channels. Th us, there are several problems facing an exporter wishing to set 
up own production, and continued smallholder production for export can thus be an 
attractive alternative for the exporters even if they have to support this production fi -
nancially.
Figure 2: Average maintenance costs for small-scale growers’
Note: GlobalGAP compliance, based on ten exporters and farmers engaged with them in trading 
relationships, Kenya, 2006 (from Graffh  am et al., 2007). “Exporter 2” in the fi gure is the vegetable 
marketing organisation mentioned in the text (comprising two exporting fi rms) while Exporter 6 
is the exporter opting for GlobalGAP’s Option 1.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics over farming in Buteko area
Average Standard deviation Minimum value Maximum value
Number of plots       5.62     3.02     2     12
Total land area (hectares)       6.23     6.65     2     20
Total yield (tons)       8.12     5.18     4.09     18.94
Exportable yield (tons)       1.06     0.67     0.53       2.46
Gross income, £ 1056 673 532 2462
Production costs, £   387 182 177   752
Net income, £   669 512 229 1709
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from a survey described in Graffh  am and MacGregor (2007).
Exporters were generally positive about the GlobalGAP system; they felt that 
good agricultural practice was important and delivered many benefi ts, especially in 
terms of good vertical and horizontal traceability, improved hygiene and better levels of 
worker safety. Exporters with compliant suppliers believed that the risk of being caught 
out on pesticide residues, microbial contamination or quality related issues is very low. 
In contrast, two of the biggest exporters in Kenya commented on the risks associat-
ed with the old system of spot buying from brokers and farmers where vertical and 
horizontal traceability was absent. Certifi cation raised the exporters’ confi dence in the 
suppliers’ ability to meet the EU retailers’ requirements. Global GAP compliant record 
keeping on the side of the farmers was seen as possible but took time to achieve; one of 
the largest exporters in Kenya reported that it took at least six months to bring a small-
scale grower up to the required standard. Th is made it important to select suitable grow-
ers, and to retain trained growers subsequent to completion of the compliance process.
Most farmers were capable of putting in place the required level of farm infra-
structure (fi eld toilets, hand-wash, plot markers, fi eld shelter and fi rst aid kit). However, 
very small farms lacked the fi nances to put in place these structures and would never 
get a return on their investment, hence several of the exporters in Kenya had eliminated 
growers with less than 0.5 hectare farms on this basis. Th e creation of centralised facil-
ities by many of the schemes in Kenya was seen as benefi cial by farmers, as they saved 
money on inputs such as seed, fertilisers, chemicals and protective clothing via bulk 
purchasing agreements. Schemes with centralised spray teams recognised the savings 
made on infrastructure and materials for crop protection. In one of the schemes, group 
organisation and improved management had been used to improve credibility for ac-
cessing credit for purchase of inputs. 
Good agricultural practice had been seen to improve effi  ciency and profi tability 
of farming operations, as yields and product quality had increased and wastage of chem-
icals had been reduced due to following proper crop protocols. GlobalGAP compliant 
record keeping enabled farmers to evaluate the profi tability of farming as a business and 
reduce theft  of inputs by farm workers. Creation of traceable plots with coded markers 
linked to records enabled many farmers to calculate the cost of production per plot and 
hence to obtain a further measure of profi tability. Introduction of proper crop rotation 
had improved soil fertility and reduced the number of pests seen in the crop. Using 
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proper harvest containers exclusively for produce has improved product quality and in-
come levels because the percentage of rejects has fallen due to less damage in handling.
However, many farmers complained that the cost of compliance was too high 
when compared to the level of return from fresh produce exports, and that the level 
of return could not justify the investment made in infrastructure and record keeping. 
Farmers who had left  GlobalGAP arrangements of their own accord primarily cited 
high investment and maintenance costs and lack of (or inadequate) price premia for 
certifi ed crops as their main reasons for doing so. Most farmers who had left  GlobalGAP 
wished to continue export crops and many still did so to non-GlobalGAP markets; some 
had switched to producing for lower-paying domestic markets only, and some had de-
veloped other businesses altogether.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Private voluntary standards such as GlobalGAP present a challenge to horticul-
tural producers and exporters in developing countries. Th e stricter requirements cause 
high investment and maintenance costs, which smallholder farmers cannot realistically 
fi nance on their own. At the same time, the problems associated with land acquisition 
and with developing domestic market links in order to sell surplus production discour-
ages exporters from expanding their own production.
What we see in the Kenyan horticultural sector is an externally induced shift  
from the traditional, spot market based supply chain to a set of strategic alliances in 
the production and export of horticultural produce. Th ose exporters who remain in the 
business, and those farmers who still sell produce in EU markets, have developed formal 
alliances linked predominantly to GlobalGAP’s Option 2 (and in the one case where 
they have not, the setup is very similar in practice to that chosen in the other alliances). 
Th e exporters continue to provide the knowhow and marketing channels that farmers 
need to sell horticultural produce in export markets, but now also provide fi nancing 
for large shares of the investments needed for certifi cation, as well as for the recurrent 
costs that farmers need in order to remain certifi ed. In return, farmers provide land 
and cheap farm labour for the exporters’ production process, but also maintain respon-
sibility for farm management and for selling surplus or discard produce domestically. 
Both groups maintain control over resources that are important for their continued 
autonomy, but the strategic alliances now in place also enable both groups to continue 
accessing foreign markets that neither could have continued to access on their own.
We propose greater use of cooperation theory to help make more effi  cient econom-
ic development interventions which are complementary with private-sector investments. 
Understanding the nature of markets, and how to intervene with both donor funding and 
private sector investment, has considerable value, and deserves further attention.
Outside of the exclusionary tendencies of PVS, there are conspicuous advantages 
to both buyer and seller in the agriculture markets in East Africa which have resonance 
for other economic sectors. Standards might be used to accelerate development initia-
tives, align private and donor investment portfolios, and effi  ciently leverage the power 
of market forces for poverty reduction.
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STRATEŠKI SAVEZI KENIJSKIH MALIH FARMERA5
James MacGregor 6, Åsa Nordin 7 & Jesper Stage 8
Sažetak
Implementacija i usklađivanje s normama i certifi ciranje često povećava troškove 
za sudionike opskrbnog lanca. Ovi povećani troškovi uzrokovani su unapređenjem proiz-
vodnje, logistike i marketinga koji su potrebni za postizanje usklađenosti, a može dovesti 
do isključivanja sudionika iz opskrbnog lanca. Konkretno, često se izvješćuje o isključenju 
malih farmera u zemljama u razvoju, što je posljedica ekspanzije i širenja privatnih do-
brovoljnih standarda (engl. Private Voluntary Standards, PVS) koje koriste i zahtijevaju 
veliki kupci. Troškovi PVS-a su po certifi kaciji, a uobičajena je jedinica pojedinačna far-
ma, bez obzira na njenu veličinu . U mnogim zemljama u razvoju u domaćoj proizvodnji 
hrane dominiraju mali posjednici i oni se suočavaju s proporcionalno većim troškovima 
po jedinici površine za certifi kaciju i usklađivanje. Prednosti PVS-a mjere se na temel-
ju jedinice proizvodnje, čime se daje prednost većim gospodarstvima. Proizvodnja malih 
posjednika u zemljama u razvoju često se odvija na manje od jednog hektara, dajući rel-
ativno malu proizvodnost. U usporedbi s troškom po farmi, ovo je svojstvena pristranost 
mnogim standardima i certifi ciranju koja ide u prilog većim gospodarstvima. Standardi 
u izvozu hortikulture potencijalno mogu pozitivno utjecati na aktivnije sudjelovanje pri-
vatnog sektora u ulaganju u male uzgajivače na način koji je obostrano koristan za uzga-
jivače i izvoznike. Takva suinvesticija je značajka trgovačkih odnosa i poslovnih modela 
koji uključuju male uzgajivače. U kenijskoj hortikulturi, donatori, izvoznici i mali posjed-
nici su u nekim slučajevima uspjeli pretvoriti zahtjeve PVS-a u profi tabilan razvoj lokalne 
poljoprivrede. U ovom radu koristi se teorija resursa strateških saveza kako bi se objasnili 
obrasci poslovnih modela koje su razvili. Predlaže se veće korištenje teorije suradnje koja 
će omogućiti učinkovitije zahvate u svrhu gospodarskog razvoja koji su komplementarni 
s privatnim investicijama. Istražuje se kako se standardi mogu koristiti za ubrzanje inici-
jativa za rast.
Ključne riječi: strateški savezi, mali poljoprivrednici, Kenija, privatne norme, 
GlobalGAP.
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